Research and Development Deliverables under Government Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements and CRADAs: University Roles, Government Responsibilities, and Contractor Rights by Conway, Danielle M.
Penn State Dickinson Law 
Dickinson Law IDEAS 
Faculty Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
Fall 2004 
Research and Development Deliverables under Government 
Contracts, Grants, Cooperative Agreements and CRADAs: 
University Roles, Government Responsibilities, and Contractor 
Rights 
Danielle M. Conway 
dzc5647@psu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/fac-works 
Recommended Citation 
Danielle M. Conway, Research and Development Deliverables under Government Contracts, Grants, 
Cooperative Agreements and CRADAs: University Roles, Government Responsibilities, and Contractor 
Rights, 9 Computer L. Rev. & Tech. J. 181 (2004). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For 
more information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
Research and Development Deliverables under
Government Contracts, Grants, Cooperative






More than anything, the United States Government is committed to re-
search and development that will ensure America's position as the leader of
nations. Nowhere is this truer than in the development of weapons and
weapons systems, for these have, until recently, been the tools of superiority.
From the tanks of World Wars I and II, to the guided weapons systems of
today, to the unmanned fighting and space exploration vehicles of tomorrow,
continued superiority of this nation will depend heavily upon the research
and development of new technologies and innovation that must have dual
uses for both the military and commercial sectors.
In the first half of the twentieth century, the United States Government
was the single largest source of funding for research and development.I Dur-
ing this period, the Government conducted extensive research and develop-
ment in its own laboratories and in Government-owned laboratories run by
Associate Professor of Law & Director of the Hawai'i Procurement Institute at
the William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i at M~noa and
Of Counsel, Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing in Honolulu, Hawai'i. I wish to thank
my students, my faculty colleagues, and the law school administration for sup-
porting my efforts with this article. I would especially like to thank Dean
Aviam Soifer for leading this law school in every respect. I also wish to thank
my research assistants for all of their diligence and loyalty to me and to my
scholarly agenda. Thank you Okechukwu Dike, Matthew Eaton, Brandon Ito,
Jason Woo, and Amanda Allen. Finally, I must thank the principals at Monts
& Ware, LLP in Dallas, Texas as well as Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen and the
Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law for the wonderful op-
portunity to present this paper at the Emerging Intellectual Property Issues
Symposium on March 19, 2004. Two well-respected law firms in Honolulu,
Hawai'i - Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing and Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel,
generously supported the research for this article.
1. Jack E. Kerrigan & Christopher J. Brasco, The Technology Transfer Revolu-
tion: Legislative History and Future Proposals, 31 PuB. CONT. L.J. 277, 279
(2002) (citing James V. Lacy et al., Technology Transfer Laws Governing Fed-
erally Funded Research and Development, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)).
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contractors. 2 The Government oversight agency, the General Accounting Of-
fice (renamed the Government Accountability Office under the George W.
Bush Administration), estimated that Government laboratories spent $16.225
billion in Fiscal Year 1990 alone? Despite this investment in research and
development and the immense productivity of these labs in developing pat-
entable inventions, the United States Government began to lose its position
as the leader in funding technology research and development.4 In fact, dur-
ing the last decade of the twentieth century, technology leadership and fund-
ing shifted to private industry, where most research and development dollars
are now spent.5 Representative Tom Davis cited statistics that the military's
share of research and development has declined from 53% to 16% of the
country's total spending from 1960 to 1999, while private sector research and
development spending rose from one-third to two-thirds of the country's total
spending during this time.6
The reasons for the shift in leadership in research and development are
myriad and complex. One factor contributing to this shift in leadership was
the end of the Cold War. With the weapons draw-down following the break
up of Soviet Russia, the military found itself pressured to reduce its budget,
particularly in the areas of research and development.7 Another factor was
the thriving economies of the 1980s and 1990s. Many private sector compa-
nies started underwriting their own efforts in research and development and
delivering new technologies and innovations for commercial use, all this
without consideration of military uses, or reliance on Government procure-
ment or Government research and development dollars.8 Yet another factor
contributing to the Government's decline in its leadership role in funding
research and development is the way in which private companies view rights
in their assets, particularly in their intellectual property assets. By no mea-
2. Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Transfer of Technologyfrom the Government to
the Private Sector: Can it be Effectively Accomplished?, 6 No. 7 NASH &
CIBINIc REP. 40 (1992).
3. Id.
4. Nancy 0. Dix et al., Fear and Loathing of Federal Contracting: Are Commer-
cial Companies Really Afraid to do Business with the Federal Government?
Should They Be?, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 5, 7 (2003).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. W. Bruce Shirk, Technology Transfer and Technology Reinvestment-A Com-
parison of Two Statutory Frameworks, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 64, 72 (1994).
8. See UNDER SEC'Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION, TECH. AND LoGISTICS, INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY: NAVIGATING THROUGH COMMERCIAL WATERS: ISSUES AND
SOLUTIONS WHEN NEGOTIATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WITH COMMERCIAL
COMPANIES, iii-iv (Version 1.1 Oct. 15, 2001) available at http://
www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/intelprop2.pdf (last visited Oct. 8, 2004) [herein-
after "DoD IP GUIDE"].
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sure is this last factor subservient or less important than any of the other
factors that have contributed to the Government's decline as the leader in
funding research and development for dual use purposes. Instead, this last
factor is, in large measure, the reason why the private sector has distanced
itself from research and development relationships, either under contracts or
through grants, with the Federal Government.9
Realizing that global leadership requires achieving an intersection be-
tween military and defense leadership, research and development leadership,
and information and technology leadership, the United States Government
has embarked on a mission to redefine its own rhetoric and philosophy about
free markets, intellectual property protection, innovation, and the roles of
various constituents, including Federal contractors, universities, and the pri-
vate commercial sector, in the research and development industry. The
United States Government is keenly aware that it must look to the private
commercial sector, including small businesses, for leadership in technology
innovation. To ensure that technology innovation retains the characteristic of
dual use, the Federal Government must be in a position to partner with the
private commercial sector as well as universities to ensure that its military
needs are considered during the research and development process.
With a significant amount of research and development funding being
led by the private sector, the Federal Government has had to repackage itself
to be a more attractive candidate for partnership. To support its "re-brand-
ing" efforts, the Government has enacted legislation that reduces the eco-
nomic risks historically encountered by Federal contractors when doing
business with the Govemment.O In addition, the Federal Government has
adjusted its procurement regulations and their underlying rationales to pro-
vide more balanced protection for intellectual property produced by contrac-
tors." Finally, the Federal Government has determined that standard
procurement contract vehicles will not entice the best and brightest minds in
universities and the private sector to partner with the Government; so in
place of the these standard vehicles, the Government has initiated greater use
of non-traditional, flexible binding instruments to facilitate mutually benefi-
cial partnerships for the development of dual use technologies.12
9. See generally Dix et al., supra note 4, at 8-9 (explaining the Government's
view about why technically oriented contractors are reluctant to do business
with the Federal Government).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 36.
12. Id. at 8.
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II. GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR, AND UNIVERSITIES
A. Government's Role in Supporting Research and Development
The United States Government's responsibility to govern and protect the
nation is a primary reason for the spending of taxpayer dollars to acquire
goods, services, and construction for the continued optimal operation of the
American infrastructure. More pointedly, the Department of Defense has the
responsibility to protect and defend the nation and the democratic ideology.
Because of its significant defense role, the Department of Defense has been a
dominant agency in the procurement of research and development as well as
of intellectual property and technology deliverables. 13 In acquiring items
ranging from prototypes to software to weapons systems, the Department of
Defense has played a significant role in developing an industry. In the
United States, technological innovations and a high level of advanced devel-
opment create new industries and sustain existing ones.'4 Government and
military needs and requirements create a catalyst for the creation of technol-
ogy intensive industries, which in turn provide a wide range of professional,
technical, and manufacturing jobs, increase economic productivity, and
strengthen national competitiveness.15
There are also other government policies that affect advanced develop-
ment indirectly. The Federal Government affects the levels of advanced tech-
nology investment in certain areas by both creating incentives for private
firms to invest and in supporting advanced technology in key areas where
private participation is inadequate.16 The Federal Government's policies for
protecting intellectual property are major engines in promoting innovation.
Similarly, the Department of Defense's revised outlook on intellectual prop-
erty protection for contract deliverables and research and development also
stimulate to some degree dual use innovations.17 Finally, the Federal Gov-
ernment's ability to open markets overseas impacts American firms' willing-
ness and ability to invest in research and development.18 Thus, at the policy
level, the role of the Federal Government as well as the Department of De-
fense in the facilitation of increased research and development is to ensure an
attractive legislative and regulatory climate for investment in innovation and
advanced technologies.
13. See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8, at iii.
14. See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8, at 2-1.
15. DoD IP GUTDE, supra note 8, at 2- 1.
16. See Dix et al., supra note 4, at 26.
17. See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8, at 2-1.
18. Id.
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B. Private Industry's Role in Supporting Research and Development
Like the Federal Government, the private commercial sector plays an
important role in advancing research and development as well as new tech-
nologies and innovations. The private sector is responsible for bringing mid-
level, applied research and product development to market for maximum
profitability to shareholders.19 Private sector capitalization influences the
growth and development of "start-up" companies.20 The private sector pro-
vides much needed capital to smaller companies that tend to operate in the
absence of any revenues for extended periods of time.21 The private sector's
ability to provide original capital facilitates small company pursuits of basic
research that often eventually leads to profitability.22 All of these activities
take capital and investment. Like the Federal Government, private sector
industry recognizes the benefit of collaborations for the purposes of sharing
facilities, sharing ideas, and building on existing research. Accordingly, the
private sector's role is to identify investment opportunities with other busi-
ness or government sectors to develop new or existing technologies to create
further developments of products, processes, materials, or services that will
enhance the nation's industrial competitiveness.
C. Higher Education's Role in Supporting Research and
Development
Before World War II, universities were peripheral to the research and
development enterprise of the United States.23 Today research universities
are at the center of American research activities, thanks in large measure to
an extraordinarily successful partnership with the Federal Government.24
The vital role research universities have played in the American economy is
one of the greatest accomplishments of the American economy. 25 As with
the Federal Government and private industry, America's world-renowned re-
search universities have been a driving force behind the nation's primacy in
science and technology.26 The American research university is unquestiona-
19. See Dix et al., supra note 4, at 24.
20. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE, 105TH CONG., REPORT ON UNLOCKING
OUR FUTURE TOWARD A NEW NATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY, pt. 3, at 38-45
(Comm. Print 105-B 1998), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/






26. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(PCAST), STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (1995), available at http://www.ostp.gov/
pcast/principles.html (last visited on Oct. 5, 2004).
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bly the best in the world.27 It has successfully combined cutting-edge re-
search and education, yielding an unmatched scientific and engineering
workforce as well as the scientific breakthroughs in numerous critical tech-
nologies.28 In fulfilling its role as a catalyst for creating basic research, uni-
versities rely on government contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements to
attract the best faculty and students to their institutions to conduct this neces-
sary research.29 In addition, universities remain competitive in research by
building intellectual property portfolios that generate capital for future re-
search and development.30 Furthermore, universities spur philanthropy and
endowments by generating intellectual property portfolios that capture the
imaginations of institutional, corporate, and individual donors. Thus, univer-
sities have the significant role of spurring educational and investment excite-
ment in the research and development of new technologies and innovations.
D. Historical Review of Government Acquisition of Inventions and
Technology
Prior to the 1960s, the Federal Government and very large contractors,
like AT&T and Bell Laboratories, drove the train of research and develop-
ment and innovation.31 This model of innovation was extremely centralized
and top down in terms of innovative direction. The areas of research and
development that received attention were those areas that specifically inter-
ested the Federal Government and its list of large contractors. Thus, to ac-
complish technological and innovative research, a company had to be willing
to submit to the centralized regime. Under the historical centralized system
of innovation, the Federal Government often insisted upon taking commer-
cial rights to inventions developed during the performance of government
contracts. 32 In return for contract performance, contractors received royalty-
free, non-exclusive licenses for the benefit of the inventors or the inventors'
employers.33 In a time when large contractors received the equivalent of the
benefit of a monopoly environment, such assignments of title to inventions
were not repulsive because market entrants and competitors to these busi-
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Dix, supra note 17.
30. Id.
31. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (Random House 2001) (describing that
during its time, AT&T's monopoly in communications was not all bad and, in
fact, did lots of good by producing an extraordinary telephone system, linking
85% of American homes, and spending billions of dollars to support telecom-
munications research. AT&T succeeded during its monopoly to attract the very
best telecommunications researchers.).
32. Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 1.
33. See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8, at Appendix E.
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nesses were inconsequential. Historically, the Federal Government allowed
its respective executive agencies to determine when the allocation of rights or
title to inventions had to inure to the Government and usually these determi-
nations varied depending on the needs of the acquiring agency. 34 While most
agencies, including the Department of the Defense, allowed title to remain in
contractors, these agencies reserved for themselves irrevocable, non-exclu-
sive, non-transferable and royalty-free licenses to practice the inventions for
the benefit of the Government.35
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Government's policy on patent
rights came under severe attack by private industry. In various studies, the
Government was seen as a detractor to the full commercialization of inven-
tions for the benefit of the American economy. 36 Observers concluded that
the Government was either not developing technologies or not funding such
development in a proper fashion.37 Likewise, private industry refused to de-
velop technologies in which there would be no control incentive in the com-
mercialization of applied research and development.38 Government and
congressional studies indicated that the Government's research and acquisi-
tion policies were incompatible with the development and commercialization
of innovative technologies.39
As evidence of this incompatibility, one need only look at the Federal
Government's posture with respect to ownership of inventions as compared
to industry's posture. Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,
various statutes and regulations concerning patents established the Govern-
ment's right to take title to federally funded patents developed during the
performance of government contracts. 40 In addition, the Government re-
tained the right to distribute the information resulting from these federally
funded projects to the general public.4' The Government premised its right
to release information from these federally funded patents on the theory that
taxpayer dollars paid for the research and its outcomes; therefore, the results
34. Diane M. Sidebottom, Intellectual Property in Federal Government Contracts:
The Past, The Present, and One Possible Future, 33 PUB. CONT. L. J. 63, 67
(2003).
35. See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8.
36. Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 1, at 279.
37. See id. at 282-83.
38. Id. at 279.
39. See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, FED. TECH. TRANSFER & THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, OTA-GP-HER-162, at 47 (Wash. D.C.: U.S. Gov't
Printing Office, Sept. 1995), available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/cgi-
bin/byteserv.prl/-ota/diskl/1995/9526/952608.PDF (last visited Oct. 21, 2004)
[hereinafter "FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION"].
40. See id. at 46.
41. Id. at 45.
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should inure to the general public.42 Thus, patents from these sponsored
projects were freely published or provided to anyone requesting access to the
materials for unrestricted purposes. 43 Contractors during this time period
were competing without the benefit of government sponsored or approved
monopolies as this was the era of free market competition.44 Accordingly,
free and open access to patents developed during the performance of govern-
ment contracts presented insurmountable problems to private industry. Con-
tractors wanted to retain the benefits of commercial applications of new
technologies for themselves and any economic benefits that flowed from
their research.45 The thought that the Government would give away freely
what seemed proprietary convinced contractors, universities, and research
centers not to develop potentially commercially viable technologies.46
In response to critical observations and reports about the dysfunctional
nature of Government use and deployment of technology to the market, Con-
gress enacted crucial legislation to balance government and industry interests
in developing and commercializing new technologies.47 Congress enacted a
series of laws to promote technology transfer and to provide technology
transfer mechanisms and incentives.48 The intent of these laws is to en-
courage partnerships in the use of resources and in the development of dual
use technologies. Three legislative initiatives inspired the decentralization of
the research and development industry - The Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovations Act of 1980;49 the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980;50 and the Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986.51 With these three pieces of legislation,
Congress began its trek to enhance private sector development and applica-
tion of results from federally funded research previously ongoing at universi-
ties, research institutions, and federal laboratory facilities.
E. Technology Transfer History
With the passage of the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act,
Congress for the first time made the transfer of technology from federal labo-
42. Id.
43. See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8, at Appendix E-1.
44. See FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION, supra note 39, at 45.
45. See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8, at Appendix E-1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION, supra note 39, at 45.
49. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3701 (West Supp. 1980).
50. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified as amended
in various sections of 35 U.S.C.).
51. 15 U.S.C.A. § 3710 (West Supp. 1986).
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ratories to the private or commercial sector a national priority.52 Primarily a
vehicle to introduce the concept of technology transfer, the Stevenson-Wyd-
ler Act stated broad policies to generate previously waning industry interest
in dealings with the Government in the areas of research and development.
The Act focused on disseminating research information from federal labora-
tories and universities to private industries in order to facilitate technical co-
operation.53 While the Act was a permissive statute that encouraged
technology transfer of Government owned inventions as opposed to a re-
quirement to transfer such information, the Act did require the establishment
of an Office of Research and Technology Applications at all Government-
owned-Government operated or Government-owned, Contractor-operated
laboratories with annual budgets greater than $20 million.54 Although tech-
nically the impetus for future technology transfer, the Stevenson-Wydler Act
was widely criticized because its permissive, non-authoritative scope gener-
ated very little movement within the Federal Government to begin actual
technology transfers for the benefit of exploiting the commercial benefits of
dual use technologies.55
In an effort to promote the policies of the Stevenson-Wydler Act and to
entice contractors, universities, and research centers back into the govern-
ment industrial base, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.56 Focused
on generating dual use technologies from basic and applied research, the
Bayh-Dole Act allowed small businesses, non-profit scientific and educa-
tional organizations, and universities to retain title to their respective inven-
tions even though those inventions resulted from work performed during the
course of a government contract, grant, or cooperative agreement.5 7 Con-
gress viewed Bayh-Dole as providing a set of broad federal rules governing
patent law that would encourage industry to develop federally funded re-
search into marketable, commercial products.58 As mentioned previously,
the Federal Government, specifically the Department of Defense, generally
maintained the policy that contractors retained title to their inventions, but
the Bayh-Dole Act was the first instance in which legislation clearly articu-
lated this policy. In a contextual view, this mandate is critical when read
against the incentives and limited monopoly provisions of intellectual prop-
52. See DoD IP GUIDE, supra note 8, at Appendix E-1.
53. See Barbara A. Duncombe, A Look at the Benefits and Pitfalls of One of the
Country's Best Kept Secrets, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 608 (1990).
54. See W. Bruce Shirk, Technology Transfer and Technology Reinvestment-A
Comparison of Two Statutory Frameworks, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 64 (1994).
55. See Duncombe, supra note 53.
56. See FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LEGISLATION, supra note 39, at 46.
57. See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 1, at 279.
58. See id.
2004]
Computer Law Review and Technology Journal
erty legislation, particularly the Patent Act,59 the Copyright Act,60 and the
Lanham Act.61
In its original form, the Bayh-Dole Act did not include large businesses
and government-owned, contractor-operated facilities as beneficiaries of the
mandate to recognize title to inventions in the contractor.62 This exclusion
was remedied by President Reagan's "Memorandum to the Heads of Execu-
tive Department and Agencies: Government Patent Policy," dated February
19, 1983.63 President Reagan's Memorandum directs the heads of all depart-
ments and agencies to extend the benefits of Bayh-Dole to all research and
development contractors, including large businesses and profit-making orga-
nizations.64 The President's rationale for this sweeping inclusion results
from the view that more often than not "allowing inventing organizations to
retain title to inventions made with Federal support is the best incentive to
obtain risk capital necessary to develop technological innovations."65 The
President and his administration further supported the extension of Bayh-
Dole benefits to large businesses by citing that "the new products and
processes that result will improve the productivity of the United States econ-
omy, create new jobs, and improve the position of the United States in world
trade."66
The 1980 legislative attempts at launching technology transfer received
a significant boost by the passage of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of
1986 ("FTTA").67 The FTTA authorized the promotion of economic com-
petitiveness in research and development by recognizing that applied re-
search would be a significant factor to achieve success in the global
marketplace. The Act also required federal agencies to work closely with
industry to accomplish technology transfer of research from federal laborato-
ries; and it tied significant government employee and laboratory incentives to
any government-industry relationship that became commercially profitable.68
The crowning features of the FTTA include placing responsibility of technol-
59. 35 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (1952).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 101, et seq. (2000).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq. (2000).
62. See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 1, at 280.
63. Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 19
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 252, 253 (Feb. 18, 1983).
64. Id.
65. President's Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agen-
cies: Government Patent Policy Fact Sheet, at http://www.hq.nasa.gov/ogc/in-
tellectual-property/memotoheads.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
66. Id.
67. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
68. Duncomb, supra note 52, at 609.
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ogy transfer success with federal laboratory scientists and engineers, creating
a reward system for government employees, providing funding for technol-
ogy transfer initiatives, providing for the exchange of personnel, services,
and equipment with industry partners, and authorizing federal laboratory di-
rectors to enter into cooperative research and development agreements
("CRADAs") with private industry.
Arguably, the proactive authority for federal laboratory directors to
enter into CRADAs is groundbreaking and transformative. Federal laborato-
ries have broad authority to fashion CRADAs in any way that permits a max-
imum exchange of technology.69 However, this authority expressly stops
short of allowing a federal laboratory to turn over its appropriated funds to a
private company as an incentive to enter into a CRADA.70 This limitation is
necessary in order to comply with the Competition in Contracting Act.71
Without the limitation, federal laboratories could circumvent the requirement
of full and open competition-the overarching principle that promotes the
integrity of the federal procurement system.
Technology transfer legislation has the potential of renewing old ties
between government, private industry, and universities. The broad authority
that permits federal laboratories to enter into CRADAs for research and de-
velopment in areas of technology consistent with the laboratory's mission
has been credited with enticing private industry and universities to seek out
advantageous relationships with particular government laboratories.72 The
deployment and use of CRADAs allow for arm's length negotiations of re-
search and development agreements with user-defined provisions related to
title and ownership interests, free flow of information, use of state of the art
laboratories and equipment, access to personnel with unique experiences and
technical capabilities, and profit sharing arrangements following the success-
ful commercial exploitation of applied research.
The future success of technology transfer largely depends on the pub-
lic's awareness of the importance of science and technology to market econo-
mies, education, national security, and government acquisitions. Also, the
success of technology transfer equally depends on public perceptions of fair-
ness and integrity regarding the exercise of government functions. To in-
crease public awareness about technology transfer, it is imperative that
government agencies, private industry, and universities, both large and small,
appreciate the Federal Government's methods for obtaining goods and ser-
vices with aspects of intellectual property or new technologies. How the
Government categorizes goods and services will determine the required ap-
proach to contract vehicles or cooperative agreements used to establish mutu-
69. See Shirk, supra note 5, at 65.
70. Shirk, supra note 5, at 66.
71. See generally Competition in Contracting Act, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat.
1175, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C. & 41 U.S.C.).
72. See Dix et al., supra note 3, at 30.
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ally beneficial relationships. The vehicles that define and balance contractual
relationships have different characteristics, purposes, and outcomes. For
each vehicle to accomplish its respective goals, all users of the various vehi-
cles must have some working knowledge of the instrument's scope and effec-
tiveness. Accordingly, the remainder of this article will describe when
certain vehicles, ranging from procurement contracts to CRADAs, should be
used to accomplish a particular goal of the Government in receiving research
and development.
F. Procurement Contracts
The major statute governing competition requirements in federal con-
tracting is the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 ("CICA").73 The
CICA requires executive agencies to seek full and open competition in all
sealed bid or negotiated procurements, except as specifically permitted by
statute.74 "Full and open competition" is defined as permitting all responsi-
ble sources to submit sealed bids or competitive proposals in response to
Government solicitations.
The Government's policy regarding competition has been revised with
the enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act ("FASA")75 and
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.76 These revisions allow the Government to
73. See 41 U.S.C. § 253 (2000), Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984). The Com-
petition and Contracting Act of 1984 amended Title III of the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act of 1949 to establish a statutory preference for
the use of competitive procedures in awarding federal contracts for property or
services. It also requires the use of competitive procedures by federal agencies
when purchasing goods or services with sealed or competitive bids. And, it
directs the head of each agency to appoint an advocate who will challenge
barriers to competition in the procurement of property and services by the
agency and review the agency's procurement activities. Division D of Public
Law 104-106 contains language that retains the current statutory competition
standard, but it also requires that the standard be applied consistently with the
government's need to "efficiently" fulfill its requirements. Further provisions
allow competition officials more discretion in determining the number of pro-
posals in the "competitive range," to provide for pre-award debriefings of un-
successful offerors, and to authorize the use of special two-phase procedures
for design and construction of public buildings.
74. See 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (2000); 41 U.S.C. § 253 (2000).
75. See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243
(1994). In the FASA, Congress made various changes that encourage and re-
ward innovation in acquisition, increase the procurement of commercially-
available items in more streamlined procedures, place more emphasis on past
contractor performance and best value contracting in making source selections,
and encourage greater professional development of the government's procure-
ment workforce.
76. See Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 5202, 110 Stat. 186
(1996). The Clinger-Cohen Act encourages agencies to use modular con-
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procure goods and services with greater ease by placing the government in a
position similar to a commercial buyer. While the government evolves into a
quasi-commercial entity in certain procurements, it still remains responsible
for ensuring competition to the maximum extent practicable. The Federal
Acquisition Regulation continues to set forth the government's requirements
in the area of competition.77 Thus, to satisfy competition requirements, not
every prospective bidder need be afforded the opportunity to bid. This inter-
pretation is based upon the Government's efforts to reasonably inform pro-
spective bidders of work, not requiring the Government to inform all
prospective bidders.78 This adequacy of competition can be challenged if a
bidder or offeror can show that the Government had a conscious and deliber-
tracting by stating that they "should, to the maximum extent practicable, use
modular contracting for an acquisition of a major system of information tech-
nology." Id. It further directs that the FAR provide that acquisitions of major
systems of information technology may be divided into several smaller acquisi-
tion increments that: (1) are easier to manage individually than in one compre-
hensive acquisition; (2) address complex information technology objectives
incrementally in order to enhance the likelihood of achieving workable solu-
tions for attainment of those objectives; (3) provide for delivery, implementa-
tion, and testing of workable systems or solutions in discrete increments each
of which comprises a system or solution that is not dependent on any subse-
quent increment in order to perform its principal functions; and (4) provide an
opportunity for subsequent increments of the acquisition to take advantage of
any evolution in technology or needs that occur during performance of earlier
increments. See id. The statute additionally states that modular contract incre-
ments should be awarded to the maximum extent practicable within 180 days
after the date on which the solicitation is issued, and if the contract for that
increment cannot be awarded within that time, it should be considered for can-
cellation. See id. It also states that the information technology provided for in
the modular contract should be delivered within 18 months after the date on
which the solicitation was issued. See id.
77. See 48 C.F.R. § 6.000 (1995) (setting forth "policies and procedures to promote
full and open competition in the acquisition process and to provide for full and
open competition, full and open competition after exclusion of sources, other
than full and open competition, and competition advocates").
78. See 48 C.F.R. § 6.101 (1995). The policy of this regulation appears as follows:
10 U.S.C. 2304 and 41 U.S.C. 253 require, with certain limited exceptions
(see subparts 6.2 and 6.3), that contracting officers shall promote and pro-
vide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Gov-
ernment contracts.
Contracting officers shall provide for full and open competition through use of
the competitive procedure(s) contained in this subpart that are best suited to the
circumstances of the contract action and consistent with the need to fulfill the
Government's requirements efficiently. Id.
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ate intent to impede the participation of prospective bidders.79 The Federal
Government's acquisition of deliverables that contain features or components
of intellectual property are subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation. Practically, what that means is
that the Federal Government's standard boilerplate language is the starting
point for such solicitations. Typically, the procurement of technology will
subject government contractors and others performing under government
contracts to the data rights provisions of the Government's acquisition regu-
lations.80 For purposes of this article, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regu-
lation will be the primary reference because most technology in this area is
procured by the Department of Defense. These regulations are constantly
evolving and, thus, create a landmine for the unwary. The task of analyzing
and applying these regulations is not made any easier when the Government
procures research and development.
When the Government contracts for research and development, it will
frequently require the contractor to deliver technical information in a form
that is usable to the Government in the future. This information typically
consists of specifications, drawings, technical reports, maintenance and oper-
ating manuals, parts lists, computer software, and other types of recorded
information. This compilation of information is referred to as technical data.
Often, the drafters of the regulations as well as the contracting agencies have
conflated the data submission requirements for research and development
contracts with rights in data that represent the actual deliverable sought by
the agency. The former information can be characterized as instructions that
assist the Government in understanding and using the deliverable, while the
latter is the actual deliverable. Obviously, these fine distinctions can create
problems for contractors and the Government in the event of a dispute.
There are also substantial difficulties in assessing how much information the
contractor should turn over to the Government and what protection the Gov-
ernment will afford to the information or the deliverable that the contractor
submits pursuant to the requirements of the procurement contract. The
problems emanate from the distinct interests of the Government versus the
contractor. The Government is concerned with acquiring a deliverable, but
also operating and maintaining the deliverable from many points around the
globe, while the contractor is concerned with protecting its competitive edge
or know-how within the industry. Contractors are also much more aware of
their intellectual property and proprietary rights, especially with respect to
achieving maximum commercial exploitation of that intellectual property.
The Federal Government, especially the Department of Defense, is
keenly aware that its past practices in the realm of procurements involving
79. See Abel Converting Inc. v. United States, 679 F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (D.D.C.
1988).
80. For the purposes of this article, the Government's license rights in both techni-
cal data as well as computer software shall be simply referred to as "data
rights."
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intellectual property garnered very few fans in various segments of the pro-
curement community, much less truly commercial businesses. In an effort to
woo these contractors and businesses back to the Federal research and devel-
opment sector, the Federal Government, specifically, the Department of De-
fense, revised its regulations to try to seek a balance between the competing
interests of the contractor on one hand and the Government on the other. The
new regulations explicitly provide that the Government obtains rights in
technical data under an irrevocable license granted or obtained for the Gov-
ernment by the contractor. 81 The contractor on the other hand retains all
rights in the data not granted to the Government, which means that the con-
tractor is the owner of the technical data in the event that national security,
export controls, or prior Government rights do not limit the contractor's own-
ership interest.82 The Government's license or use rights fall into three cate-
gories and one outlying category. The three categories include a limited
rights license,83 a Government purpose rights license,84 and an unlimited
rights license.85 The outlying category is called a special negotiated li-
cense,86 which is formed under special circumstances. The categories deter-
mine what uses the Government can make of the technical data that it
receives from a particular contractor. The category of license that will apply
to the Government is determined by the source of funding the contractor
received in performing the Government contract. 87
The Government is entitled to unlimited use rights in technical data in
various situations, notably when the data pertaining to items, components, or
processes have been or will be developed exclusively with Government
funds or when technical data is generated directly from the performance of
experimental, developmental, or research work specified as an element of
performance under a government contract or subcontract.88 The broad scope
of this use right entitles the Government to use or disclose technical data to
anyone for any purpose. 89 Moreover, the Government retains the right to
permit others to use or to disclose the technical data with few restrictions.90
Notably, this license permits the Government to disclose technical data to a
contractor's competitor. The scope and breadth of the unlimited use rights
stabs at the heart of all things proprietary. While the disclosure of technical
81. 48 C.F.R. § 227.7103-4 (1995).
82. Id.
83. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(13).
84. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(12).
85. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(15).
86. Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(4).
87. Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(1)-(b)(4).
88. Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(1)(iii).
89. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(15).
90. Id.
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data under the government contract does not destroy the nature of a contrac-
tor's information as a trade secret or as proprietary information, the future
right of another to disclose the trade secret obtained from the Government
will destroy the proprietary and secret character of the information. For this
reason alone, private industry contractors interested in research and develop-
ment will shy away from doing research under government contracts. To
encourage commercial utilization of technologies developed under govern-
ment contracts, the provisions instruct that the Government may agree to
accept technical data subject to Government purpose license rights.91 This
reduction in use rights is an example of the Department of Defense's com-
promise in recognizing the intellectual property and proprietary interests of
private industry.
The Government is entitled to only Government purpose license rights
in technical data associated with an item, component, or process developed in
part with Government funds and in part at private expense whenever a con-
tractor provides notice of such mixed funding with respect to such data.92
This type of license anticipates a prior negotiation between the Government
and the contractor. The Government purpose rights license grants the Gov-
ernment a right to use, modify, disclose, or release technical data within the
Government without restriction, but limits similar conduct to only Govern-
ment purposes when the technical data will be released outside of the Gov-
ernment to a third party who must agree to a use and non-disclosure
agreement that limits the third party's use to the same Government pur-
poses.93 The time period for the life of a Government purpose rights license
is five years, after which the license converts to an unlimited use rights li-
cense.94 Examples of Government purposes include competitive procure-
ment and foreign military sales.95 Government purposes obviously do not
include disclosure of technical data for commercial purposes. The problem
that the private industry has identified with Government purpose rights is that
the five-year window of time to commercialize a dual use technology may
not be long enough to recoup the private portion of the mixed-funding invest-
ment in the item, component, or process before the Government purpose
91. 48 C.F.R. § 252.227-7013(a)(13) (1995).
92. Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(l)(ix)(B)(2)(i)(A).
93. Dix, supra note 4, at 16.
94. 48 C.F.R. § 252.227-7013(b)(2)(ii) (1995).
95. See generally id. § 252.227-7013(a)(11) (2004) (defining Government purpose
as any activity in which the United States Government is a party, including
cooperative agreements with international or multi-national defense organiza-
tions, or sales or transfers by the United States Government to foreign govern-
ments or international organizations. Government purposes include
competitive procurement, but do not include the rights to use, modify,
reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose technical data for commercial
purposes or authorize others to do so.).
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rights license converts into an unlimited rights license for the benefit of the
Government.
The Government obtains only a limited rights license in unpublished
technical data pertaining to items, components, or process developed exclu-
sively at private expense, provided that the contractor properly marks the
technical data with the appropriate limited rights legends before submitting
the technical data to the Government.96 The limited rights license allows the
Government to use or disclose technical data only within the Government.97
The Government cannot use the data to manufacture the item, component, or
process, except in the event that an emergency repair or overhaul is re-
quired.98 The Government may, however, with the contractor's consent, dis-
close the technical data to third parties who may need to provide service and
support for the item, component, or process. 99
Finally, the Government can enter into negotiations with a contractor to
develop a special license.100 The standard rights referred to above may not
satisfy either the contractor's needs or the Government's needs. In rare situa-
tions, the Government may even be willing to accept lesser rights in technical
data. The purpose for specially negotiated rights is to allow the Government
to assess its true minimum needs. If the Government can take lesser rights
than it is entitled to under a particular procurement, then the Government
should take such an opportunity to develop goodwill amongst its contractors.
Several provisions may be the subject matter of a specially negotiated li-
cense, including escrowing technical data with third parties unless and until
an actual Government contingency is encountered, limiting the particular use
of technical data to a certain agency instead of allowing full disclosure within
the entire Government, and extending the time limit when Government pur-
pose rights license converts to unlimited license rights.
G. Other Transaction
The Other Transaction vehicle is not a procurement contract, grant or
cooperative agreement, or a cooperative research and development agree-
ment ("CRADA"), but it is a legal instrument to be used when it is not appro-
priate or feasible to use a procurement contract or a cooperative
agreement. 101 Often referred to as "freedom of contract" instruments, Other
96. Id. § 252.227-7013(b)(3)(A).
97. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(13).
98. Id. § 252.227-7013(a)(13)(i).
99. MATTHEW S. SIMCHAK & DAVID A. VOGEL, LICENSING SOFTWARE & TECH-
NOLOGY TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO RIGHTS TO IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN PRIME CONTRACTS AND SUBCONTRACTS 133 (CCH
Inc. 2000).
100. 48 C.F.R. § 227.7103-5 (1995).
101. 10 U.S.C. § 2371(e)(2) (2000).
2004]
Computer Law Review and Technology Journal
Transaction vehicles are subject to fewer laws and regulations than procure-
ment contracts and CRADAs.102 The Department of Defense is one of the
few agencies authorized to use the Other Transaction instrument, which may
be of two types.
The first type is the Science and Technology Other Transaction, which
can be used to accomplish basic research, applied research, or advanced re-
search projects.103 The characteristics of a Science and Technology Other
Transaction include a funds out mechanism in which the Government pays
funds for the research, but the Government seeks, when practicable, a 50%
cost share agreement. 104 In addition, the Government cannot duplicate al-
ready existing research.105 Finally, the Government must report the use of
the Science and Technology Other Transaction instrument to Congress.106
The second type of Other Transaction is the Prototype Other Transac-
tion, which is directly relevant for the development of weapons or weapons
systems that the Department of Defense plans to acquire.107 The characteris-
tics of this type of Other Transaction are again flexibility, the proscription
that prototype research cannot already be ongoing under another contract
mechanism, the contractor is paid according to a funds out method from the
Government, cost sharing by the contractor is not required, a fee or profit is
available for the contractor, the Government uses competitive procedures
when practicable, and the agency must provide a report to Congress annually
when the instrument is used to acquire a prototype. 108 In essence, the use of
an Other Transaction instrument is akin to allowing the Government and the
contractor to write a contract beginning with a blank sheet of paper as op-
posed to incorporating myriad contract clauses required by the Defense Fed-
eral Acquisition Regulation or the many regulations of the Office of
Management and Budget. The Other Transaction vehicle is probably the
closest the Government will ever come to negotiating agreements like market
participants in private industry. Negotiating terms from the inception of a
relationship allows the contractor to maintain a competitive advantage in the
commercial marketplace while permitting the Government to have access to
cutting-edge technologies.
H. Grants and Cooperative Agreements
Most Government activities are carried out directly by the Government
or under funds out agreements with other parties for the benefit of the Gov-
102. Dix, supra note 4, at 26.




107. Dix, supra note 4, at 24.
108. Id. at 25.
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emnment. Grants and cooperative agreements, while funds out mechanisms,
are not procurement instruments and, therefore, these instruments cannot be
used to acquire goods and services for the direct benefit of the Govern-
ment.109 Despite this restriction, the Government can use a grant or coopera-
tive agreement vehicle if the Government's primary purpose in doing so is to
provide technical assistance or promote assistance relationships for the pub-
lic. A Federal agency may use a grant or cooperative agreement instead of a
procurement contract when
the principal purpose of the relationship is to transfer a thing of
value to the State or local government or other recipient to carry
out a public purpose of support or stimulation authorized by a law
of the United States instead of acquiring (by purchase, lease, or
barter) property or services for the direct benefit or use of the
United States Government... 110
The choice between using a grant or a cooperative agreement depends on
whether the Government intends to be substantially involved in the project.
If there is substantial Government involvement, then the appropriate instru-
ment for use is a cooperative agreement; otherwise, when Government in-
volvement is less than substantial, then the appropriate instrument for use is a
grant. 1 ' Federal grants and cooperative agreements are relatively flexible in
that they are only subject to the Office of Management and Budget's infor-
mal advisories and agency regulations.112
I. Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
A Cooperative Research and Development Agreement ("CRADA") is
defined as any agreement between one or more Federal laboratories and one
or more non-Federal parties under which the Government, through its labora-
tories, provides personnel, services, facilities, equipment, intellectual prop-
erty, or other resources with or without reimbursement (but not funds to non-
Federal parties) and the non-Federal parties provide funds, personnel, ser-
vices, facilities, equipment, intellectual property, or other resources toward
the conduct of specified research or development efforts that are consistent
with the missions of the laboratory.]3
The primary purpose of a CRADA is to encourage the transfer of com-
mercially useful technology from Federal laboratories to the private sector.
Unlike funds out agreements where the Government distributes appropriated
109. Dix, supra note 4, at 27.
110. 31 U.S.C. §§ 6304(1), 6305(1) (2000).
111. Id. § 6304(2).
112. See Kurt M. Rylander, Scanwell Plus: Challenging the Propriety of a Federal
Agency's Decision to Use a Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement, 28
PUB. CONT. L. J. 69, 70-71 (1998).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(d)(1) (2000).
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funds to a contractor, grantor, or collaborator, CRADAs expressly prohibit
the distribution of appropriated funds to a non-Federal CRADA party.
1 4
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement authority emanates
from the Stevenson-Wydler Act.115 All Federal Government-owned labora-
tories, which are operated either by Government personnel or contractor per-
sonnel, have flowed down CRADA authority.116 Unlike garden-variety
procurement contracts, there are no government-wide standard clauses or
regulations for CRADAs. In fact, CRADAs are distinguishable from pro-
curement contracts in one major respect - the transfer of funds for CRADA
collaboration flows, if at all, from the contractor or private entity to the Fed-
eral laboratory, and not the other way. In addition, Federal laboratory direc-
tors do not enter CRADAs for research and development that are inconsistent
with that particular laboratory's mission. Furthermore, CRADA relation-
ships are typically characterized by a private non-Federal entity directing the
research and development of a project as opposed to the Government di-
recting the research and development. With such a relationship, the private
entity is bearing more of the risk as compared to the Government laboratory.
Thus, the protection afforded by strict contract clauses and regulations for the
benefit of the Government and for the taxpayer is relatively unnecessary to
achieve during the performance of a CRADA because the risks of nonper-
formance are borne, at least financially, by the private entity partner to the
CRADA.
Because there are no strict requirements for contract clauses and provi-
sions, a director of a laboratory may negotiate terms including licensing
agreements, payment of funds into the Government, the availability of per-
sonnel and services, intellectual property agreements, the granting of pre-
sumptive rights to inventions, and the waiver of Government rights to
inventions except for a Government purpose license. The CRADA mecha-
nism is a very flexible approach to maintaining a relationship with the Gov-
ernment and directing Government research and development without many
of the risks of loss of intellectual property or proprietary interests. The bene-
fits of CRADAs are myriad and the private industry can take advantage of
the opportunity to partner with the Federal Government to develop and then
commercialize dual use technologies.
Il. CONCLUSION
There are many roles to be played in the research and development of
technology for the 21st Century. Innovation depends on industry players
performing these roles under optimal circumstances. The Government has
the role of setting policy, promoting leadership in innovation, and providing
114. Carl L. Vacketta et al., Technology Transfer, 94-12 BRIEFING PAPERS 1, 3
(1994).
115. Shirk, supra note 7, at 65-66.
116. See id.
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the means and the mechanisms to accomplish research and development at
the basic research, applied research, and advanced research levels of science
and technology. A significant role for the Government is to train its agen-
cies, departments, and personnel about supporting innovation efforts through
correct identification and uses of contractual vehicles to form lasting and
productive relationships with private industry and universities to ensure con-
tinued leadership in research and development. Likewise, private industry
and universities have distinct roles to play in providing resource capital in-
vestment and human capital investment, respectively. In addition, private
industry and universities must seek out opportunities to collaborate with Fed-
eral, State, and local governments to advance research and development for
the continued growth of community as well as national infrastructures.
Finally, there may be times when the Government, private industry, and
universities must also balance the national interest in promoting knowledge
innovation with the conveyance of individual proprietary interests. There
may be circumstances in which the national public interest must prevail over
individual property rights in order to achieve strong leadership in the re-
search and development of technology and innovation. Procurement laws
and policies were established to balance the very interests of fair competition
with social and economic interests of the nation-state. This balancing is no
less important in the various segments of the entire procurement community.
One thing is clear: successful collaboration for optimal research and develop-
ment outcomes is only assured when all parties are well versed in the mecha-
nisms applicable to building contractual and special relationships with the
Government for the advancement of technology and innovation.
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